146 Personhood of Natural Entities: The Case of the Fox River Nooriyah Doriwala The proposition of personhood of natural entities has been growing in popularity since Christopher Stone’s debut of the idea in 1972. Since then, grassroots organizations and governments have navigated the legal system to provide this distinction to ecosystems, including rivers. While pursuing environmental personhood for the Fox River is not a favorable distinction, the designation would be an important step to shifting our ideologies from nature's conservation for human recreation to nature's inherent right to exist. What is Personhood? Christopher Stone, a professor of law at University of Southern California, developed the concept of personhood in his book titled: Should Trees Have Standing?–Towards Legal. Rights for Natural Objects. Stone examines the seemingly outlandish claim that “we give legal rights to forests, oceans, rivers and other so-called ‘natural objects’ in the environment – indeed, to the natural environment as a whole.”1 Stone tackles three framework concepts: can the legal system support the assignment of natural objects as “persons,” whether humans have an obligation to do so; and is society better off for it. To each of these, he answers yes, providing examples such as the legal standing of other non-human entities (e.g. corporations), the ability for natural entities to receive reparations for actions taken against its best interest (e.g. monetary), and that since ultimately, humans rely on the 1 Christopher Stone, “Should Trees Have Standing? Towards Legal Rights for Natural Objects,” Southern California Law Review (1972) https://iseethics.files.wordpress.com/2013/02/stone-christopher-d-should-trees-have-standing.pdf
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